

Section III: Crime Prevention Theories

Different Crime Prevention Theories

1. **CPTED:** Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
2. **Situational Crime Prevention:**
3. **Defensible Space:**
4. **Routine Activities:**
5. **Crime Pattern Theory:**
6. **Broken windows**
7. **Pockets of Crime**

CPTED: Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

Created by C. Ray Jeffery

Basic of Theory:

Aimed at identifying conditions of the physical and social environment that provide opportunities for or precipitate criminal acts and the alteration of those conditions so that no crimes occur.

Main Idea: Crime can be facilitated or inhibited by features of the physical environment.

The way to prevent crime is to design the “Total Environment”

It is the opposite of the reactive strategies of the police.

Logic behind CPTED

Closely related to rational choice theory.

Crime reduction can be achieved through policies that convince potential criminals to desist from criminal activities, delay their actions, or avoid a particular target.

Thus crime prevention can be achieved through one of 3 ways:

1. Potential targets are carefully guarded.
2. Means to commit crime are controlled.
3. Potential offenders are carefully monitored

Logic behind CPTED continued

Crime prevention efforts aimed at people, such as general and specific deterrence are less sure to work because of the high mobility of people.

People are not permanent fixtures of an environment for very long, they move around a good deal throughout the day.

HOWEVER

Things such as buildings and other physical features of the environment are relatively permanent

As a result, CPTED can produce effects on crime and perceptions of personal crime risk.

Design Principles for Reducing Crime

Control Natural Access: Encouraging people to go where they will do no harm or receive no harm.

Example: Using hedges, shrubs, gates and fences to direct people to the entrance and exits of buildings.

Provide Natural Surveillance: Placing potential crime targets in places where they can be watched easily.

Example: Making front windows on houses face those across the street.

Foster Territorial Behavior: Marking territorial areas so that they are easily observed and noted.

Example: Do landscaping so that it is readily apparent where one apartment ends and another begins.



Access Control

Natural
Surveillance

Territorial
Behavior

Crime Prevention Strategies

The three main design approaches apply to three main strategies.

Natural Strategies: Security results from the design and layout of space.

Both human and capital costs are low.

Organized Strategies: Security guards or police play the central role.

Labor intensive and expensive.

Mechanical Strategies: Alarms, cameras and other hardware are used to control access and provide surveillance.

Expensive equipment and requires additional employees to monitor and respond to alarms.

Natural strategies are superior economically and avoid confrontation by preventing crime from happening in the first place.

The Three “D’s” of CPTED

Based on the three dimensions of human space to describe useful CPTED strategies that can be used in various environments, including commercial, residential and school environments.

3 Dimensions of Human Space

1. Designation
2. Definition
3. Design

Using the Three D's as a guide, any given space may be evaluated by asking a series of questions.

Designation

These questions are designed to determine if the space/area has been altered or co-opted from its original purpose.

If the space is not being used as was originally intended, changes must be made to return it to its original use.

1. What is the designated purpose of this space?
2. For what purpose was it originally intended?
3. How well does the space support its current use or its intended use?
4. Is there conflict?

Definition

These questions are aimed at the issue of Territoriality

Specifically, does territorial behavior exist in this area.

If not, then tactics can be implemented to try and establish territorial behavior among the users of the space.

1. How is space defined?
2. Is it clear who owns it?
3. Where are its borders?
4. Are there social or cultural definitions that affect how space is used?
5. Are the legal or administrative rules clearly set out and reinforced in policy?
6. Are there signs?
7. Is there conflict or confusion between purpose and definition?

Design

Questions are aimed at determining if there are problems with the actual design of the location.

If the design is poor, then redesigning the location is used to improve prevention.


1. How well does the physical design support the intended function?
2. How well does the physical design support the desired or accepted behaviors?
3. Does the physical design conflict with or impede the productive use of the space or the proper functioning of the intended human activity?
4. Is there confusion or conflict in the manner in which physical design is intended to control behavior?

CPTED Example

Traffic Flow in a Neighborhood:

Reducing or restricting traffic flow in a neighborhood can prevent criminal activity by preventing easy access in and out of an area.

- Entry portals control street access.
- Gates at cul-de-sacs control foot traffic.



Research on CPTED

1. Much of the practical applications of CPTED have been in target hardening.

Largely successful

2. Increasing street lighting in crime prone areas reduced crime.
3. Creating cul-de-sacs in very dangerous areas of Los Angeles reduced the occurrence of drive-by shootings.
4. Making entrances and exits into public housing area one-way reduced crime overall in those areas.
5. Placing strategic barricades of streets leading into a major drug neighborhood in order to limit access reduced drug related offenses.

Problems with CPTED

1. Does not deal with underlying causes of crime.

Criminal motivation is still high despite decreased crime targets.

2. Crime is not stopped only dispersed.

Crime reduced in one place, increases in another.

Defensible Space

Created by an Architect, named **Oscar Newman**

His goal was to create **safer public housing**

Main Idea:

Design a **residential environment** in order to allow and even encourage residents themselves to supervise and be seen by outsiders as responsible for their neighborhoods.

It attempts to reduce **both crime and fear of crime** in a specific area by:

1. Reducing opportunity for crime and
2. Fostering positive social interaction among residents.

Pruitt-Igoe



Pruitt-Igoe



Conceptual image of
community corridor.

Actual image of community
corridor.



Logic behind Defensible Space

Defensible space design attempts to strengthen two kinds of social behavior within a residential area:

Territoriality: Personal sense of ownership over an area.

Natural Surveillance: Placing potential crime targets in places where they can be watched easily

Areas low in defensible space are theoretically more vulnerable to crime because **feelings of community spirit and ownership** are not generated by residents and they are **less likely to be able to recognize outsiders as potential criminals**.

In small areas defensible space increases the effectiveness of informal social control which makes crime less likely.

Design Goals of Defensible Space

Improve Visibility: Improve visibility between apartment units/homes by residents.

Areas that are out of view cannot be controlled

Increase Public Areas: Create spaces where residents could gather, thereby increasing the potential for resident *surveillability*.

If you bring residents together they are more likely to know each other and watch each others places.

Overall you want to reduce anonymity and isolation of people and places within a community.

Local Space

A key part of improving Defensible space is to improve the control of Local Space

Newman divides local space into four different categories:

Public: Places where no one has control or dominion.

Does not refer to ownership or property rights, but practical control of space.

Example: Streets

Semi-Public: Places that people treat as having SOME responsibility over, despite their public ownership.

Example: Sidewalks in front of homes.


Local Space

Semi-Private: Areas that are controlled by a person(s) but are within view of the public.

Example: Backyard of a house.


Private: Places in which people have complete ownership and are able to watch completely and deny access to others.

Example: Inside of home.




- All interior spaces are within the private domain of the family.
- All grounds around the private unit are for the private use of the family.
- There is a direct abutment between private grounds and the sidewalk.
- The domain of the house encompasses the street.

Local Space-Town homes



Local Space-Apartments



Local Space and Crime Prevention

1. Private supervision is the key to crime prevention.
2. Things are more likely to be stolen if they are left in public or semi-public space.
3. Move as much space as possible to the private end of the scale so as to increase security and prevent crime.
4. People will look after their own private and perhaps semi-private space, whereas people on the street will provide “natural surveillance” of semi-public areas.
5. In pure public areas surveillance of any type is difficult and crime risk is greatest.

Good use of Local Space ?



Good use of Local Space ?




Example of Defensible Space Design

Design neighborhoods so that they increase **territoriality** and natural **surveillance**.

HOW WOULD YOU INCREASE BOTH IN THIS CASE?







Impact of Defensible Space

Projects sprang up everywhere using Defensible Space concepts.
Largely focused on

Housing Projects

Schools

Mixed Use communities

Main strategies included:

Roads were closed or narrowed; More one-way streets; Increased use of sidewalks; Improved outdoor lighting; increased development of public areas; development of “mixed-income” homes in neighborhoods

Research on Defensible Space

1. Low-rise buildings instead of high-rise buildings in Government housing areas reduces overall crime.
2. Use of low fences in neighborhoods increases territoriality and decreases incidence of burglary and theft.
3. Small streets in residential areas increases neighborhood supervision and lowers crime.
4. A larger number of small parks rather than a small number of large parks reduces incidents of crime by decreasing large public areas where surveillance is poor.

However

Impact of design changes on overall crime in areas outside of public housing units was almost non-existent.

Problems with Defensible Space

1. Does not deal with underlying causes of crime.

Criminal motivation is still high despite decreased crime targets.

2. Crime is not stopped only dispersed.

Crime reduced in one place, increases in another.

3. Most solutions are of architectural rather than police orientation.

Situational Crime Prevention

Book written by **Ronald Clarke** in 1992

Tactics and ideas are similar to those of CPTED and Defensible Space.

Main Idea:

Situational crime prevention is aimed at eliminating opportunities for crime.

It includes opportunity-reducing measures that are directed at highly specific forms of crime

Tactics include the management, design or manipulation of the immediate environment in as systematic and permanent way as possible so as to **increase the effort and risks of crime** and **reduce the rewards** associated with crime.

Development of Situational Crime Prevention

Situational crime prevention is heavily used by crime prevention units in other countries such as Holland, Great Britain, and Sweden

The situational crime prevention model originated from lessons learned from research on correctional treatments by the British government's Home Office Research Unit.

Research demonstrated the potential for designing out crime and other actions by manipulating situational factors in the immediate environment.

This research along with the development of Problem Oriented Policing led to the development of Situational Crime Prevention.

Categories of Situational Crime Prevention

1. Increase effort needed to commit crime.
2. Increase risks of committing crime.
3. Reduce rewards of committing crime.
4. Induce guilt or shame for committing crime.

Tactics of Situational Crime Prevention

Increase the perceived effort of crime

1. Harden targets
2. Control access to targets
3. Deflect offenders from targets
4. Control crime facilitators

Increase the perceived risks of crime

5. Screen entrances and exits
6. Formal surveillance
7. Surveillance by employees
8. Natural surveillance

Reduce the anticipated rewards of crime

9. Remove targets
10. Identify property
11. Reduce temptation
12. Deny benefits

Induce Guilt or Shame

13. Set rules
14. Alert consciences
15. Control disinhibitors
16. Assist compliances

Strategies to Increase Effort Needed to Commit Crime

In attempting to increase the effort required to commit a crime 3 strategies are focused on primarily.

1. **Target Hardening:** Making the potential target of criminal victimization more difficult to victimize.

Example: Unbreakable glass on storefronts, locking gates, fenced yards



A. Adjustable shootbolt keep
B. 'One piece' adjustable keep plate
C. Yale multilock

Strategies to Increase Effort Needed to Commit Crime

2. **Access Control:** Limiting access to an area in order to reduce criminals chance of offending.

Example: Parking lot barriers, secure doors to stores



Strategies to Increase Effort Needed to Commit Crime

3. **Deflecting Offenders:** Locating business and services so as to divert criminal opportunity.

Example: Residential behind retail in mixed use.



Research Findings

Researchers claim hundreds of examples of success using Situational Crime Prevention to reduce crime.

- Street closing in London to prevent prostitution in cars;
- Identification requirements to prevent check frauds in Sweden in the 1980s;
- Improved street lighting in council housing estates in England;
- Responsible drinking practices to control public drunkenness in Australia;
- Cash reduction in US convenience stores;
- Worldwide airport baggage screening;
- CCTV in British town centers;
- Automatic cameras at traffic lights in Scotland;
- Graffiti cleaning on the New York subway; and
- Anti-robbery screens in London post-offices.

Research Findings Continued

While research indicates that Situational Crime Prevention tactics have been very successful, the results need to be taken with a grain of salt:

Many of the findings deal with relatively minor crimes

Many of the crimes where tactics have been successful have been crimes against private organizations, not street crimes against people.

Methods used to evaluate effectiveness of the tactics have been less than scientific, with no control groups and almost no follow-ups.

Problems and Criticisms of Situational Crime Prevention

- 1. Ignores Causes of Crime:** Deals only with conditions and target hardening, ignoring the motivations of offenders.

May lead to more serious crime by ignoring motivations and making targets more difficult.

- 2. Protects Businesses not Citizens:** Deals only with preventing crime and doesn't deal with factors that lead to crime.

Criticized as letting government off the hook.

Most practitioners don't care.

- 3. Displacement of Crime:** Not as severe as would be thought, but it does occur to some degree.

Routine Activities Theory

Originally created by Cohen and Felson

Main Idea:

For crime to occur there must be the intersection of three things:

1. Motivated Offenders.
2. Suitable Target.
3. Absence of a capable guardian.

Structural changes in the routine activities of society can influence crime rates by affecting the convergence in space of these three elements.

Routine Activities Theory

Routine Activities: Any number of activities, including work, leisure, social interaction.

These activities can occur at home or away from home.

When these routine activities are performed within or near the home, lower risks of crime are expected because they enhance guardianship capabilities.

That is, since higher levels of guardianship increase the likelihood that offenders will be seen, the risk for criminal victimization is reduced.

Routine activities attempts to explain higher crime rates since WWII by stating that more people are in the workplace leaving more homes unattended for long periods of time.

Routine Activities and Crime Prevention

Of the 3 main factors, most of the emphasis is placed on **suitable targets**, with capable guardians getting some focus and motivated offenders almost none.

Thus, our discussion will focus mostly on **suitable targets**, with some discussion of **capable guardians** and no discussion of **motivated offenders**.

Suitable Targets

A criminals choice of a victim or target is influenced by four related factors: VIVA

- 1. Value or desirability of target:** How much value is associated with the particular target.
- 2. Inertia of the target:** The weight or ease of movement of the target.

Small items such as TV's have more inertia than couches.
- 3. Visibility of the target:** Is the target easily visible by potential offenders.
- 4. Access to and escape from the target:** Those areas where access to and from are easiest are more likely to be victimized.

It is the combination of these 4 factors that makes victimization likely

Neighborhoods and Suitable Targets

Community Rhythms: The flow of people through a community is important to understanding its potential for criminal victimization.

Some communities by nature of their rhythm are more attractive to motivated offenders.

A given location may range from crowded to deserted depending upon the time, day of week, or month.

THUS, to understand the likelihood of victimization within a community it is necessary to consider:

Map: Locations

Clock: Time of Day

Calendar: Day of the week.

Neighborhoods and Suitable Targets

Permeable Neighborhoods: Those with a greater than usual number of access streets from traffic arteries into the neighborhood.


These areas are more attractive to criminals because they appear more open and vulnerable and offer more potential escape routes.

Spillover Effect: When criminals commute to a distant location to commit a crime.

Criminals generally commit crime in areas which are in their normal routine travel areas, where they feel comfortable.

They commute to these areas usually because of: Perception of lax security, attractiveness of area as potential target, abundance of goods OR police practices in “**home turf**”.

HIGHLY PERMEABLE NEIGHBORHOOD



NON-PERMEABLE NEIGHBORHOOD



Capable Guardians

While most of the focus of crime prevention is on suitable targets, crime can also be decreased through increasing the presence of capable guardians.

Methods of Increasing Capable Guardians:

1. Increased Police patrol.

Particularly aggressive patrol

2. Increased surveillance of area by residents.

3. Target hardening.

Routine Activities Research

1. Those areas where a higher percentage of residents are home during the day have lower property crime rates.
2. Corner homes, usually near traffic lights or stop signs, are the ones most likely to be burglarized.
3. Secluded homes, such as those at the end of a cul-de-sac or surrounded by wooded areas make more suitable targets.
4. Criminals are more likely to drift towards a city center than move outwards to commit a crime.
5. Communities that organize themselves, restrict traffic, change street patterns and limit neighborhood entrances and exits will reduce property crime levels.

Criticism/Problems with Routine Activities

- 1. Ignores Offenders:** While motivated offenders are mentioned in the theory, in practice offenders are ignored.

Impact is similar to other theories

- 2. Data for Analysis:** Data for conducting direct tests of the theory are almost impossible to acquire.

Few true tests of RA have been conducted

Crime Pattern Theory

Created by Brantingham and Brantingham

Influenced by several different theories, including Routine Activities, Rational Choice and environmental principles relating to crime.

Main Idea:

Criminal acts are most likely to occur in areas where the awareness space of an offender intersects with perceived suitable targets.

Most criminals do not chose their crime sites randomly, but rather their criminal site choices are spatially structured.

Main theory underlying Geographic Profiling

Crime Pattern Theory view of Criminal Event

1. They view the criminal event as the end point in a decision process or sequence of decision steps;
2. The decision process or sequence of decision steps is rational;
3. The decisions themselves are neither random nor unpredictable;
4. The decision process begins with an offender who is ready for crime (who has sufficient motivation and knowledge to commit the crime);
5. Criminal motivations and states of readiness come from diverse sources;
6. Whether the offender's state of readiness leads to crime is a function of environmental factors, such as available opportunities;
7. The number and sequence of decision points in the process that leads to a criminal event vary with the type and quantity of crime such that the decision process is crime-specific;
8. The level of crime readiness in any offender varies over time and place given his or her background and site-specific features;

Crime Pattern Theory view of Criminal Event

9. Neither motivated offenders nor opportunities for crime are uniformly distributed in space and time;
10. Opportunities for crime are developed by routine activities of daily life (e.g., commuting patterns during the week and leisure activities on weekends);
11. How suitable a target is, is a function of the characteristics of the target and the characteristics of the target's surroundings;
12. The target identification process (e.g., what makes a good or bad target) is a multi-staged process contained within a general environment;
13. Individuals develop images about what surrounds them, which make up "templates," or "an aggregate image" which help establish an array of cues, cue sequences, and cue clusters that identify what should be considered a 'good' target in specific cites and situations“

Crime Pattern Theory view of Criminal Event

14. These templates vary by specific crimes, offenders, and the general context for the crime, such that what makes a good target for one type of crime and offender, may not for another; and finally
15. Crime is complex, but still “contains discernible patterns both for crimes and for criminals at both detailed and general levels of analysis.”

Thus, they see that "Crimes are patterned; decisions to commit crimes are patterned; and the process of committing a crime is patterned."

Important Crime Pattern Theory Concepts

Nodes: Main geographic points in a persons life.

Example: Home, Work, School, Girlfriends Home

Paths: The main arteries of travel between Nodes.


Essentially how people travel between their main nodes, the main travel routes.

People are very ritualistic in their travels


Edges: The boundaries of areas where people engage in their activities.

Example: Neighborhood or city boundaries


Important Crime Pattern Theory Concepts



Important Crime Pattern Theory Concepts



Important Crime Pattern Theory Concepts



Awareness Space

Central aspect in the logic of Crime Pattern Theory

Awareness Space: Locations and areas that a person is aware of and possesses at least a minimum level of knowledge about..

A person's awareness space forms part of their mental map and is constructed primarily, but not exclusively, from the spatial experiences of the individual.

An awareness space is composed of various **activity sites** and the connecting network of travel and commuting routes.

Activity Sites: Residence, workplace, social activity locations.

Well-known locations (landmarks, tourist sites, important buildings) may also become part of a person's awareness space without being places they travel to.

Target Selection in Crime Pattern Theory

Potential targets are noticed through an offenders normal, “routine activities”.

As people make their way along paths between nodes they will notice potential victims (people, property, etc..).

A reasonably rational offender who is engaged in his or her daily routine activities, will notice unguarded and unmanaged places and will be most likely to offend in these areas

The routine activities of potential offenders have effects on both **spatial** and **temporal** aspects of offending.

When and where they travel will determine the potential victims they see


Target Selection in Crime Pattern Theory

1. Targets are selected within an offender's awareness space.

Criminals are somewhat lazy, sticking close to known places and routes.

2. Possible targets are assessed against the criteria of suitability (profit to be gained) and risk (likelihood of getting caught).
3. Targets are also scanned for certain cues (visibility, ease of mobility, etc..)
4. Offender makes a rational choice to choose a specific target for victimization.

Target Selection in Crime Pattern Theory



Crime Pattern Theory and Crime Prevention

- **Awareness Space:** Connectivity/Permeability of streets greatly impacts awareness space of offenders.
 - Balanced connectivity: Neighborhoods should not be overly permeable, not should they completely restrict movement.
- **Suitability of Target:** Design should work to make targets (homes, etc..) as unsuitable as possible.
 - Good natural surveillance
 - Effective lighting systems
 - Physical Protection
 - Landscaping should be well maintained.

Broken Windows

Originated with **James Q. Wilson** and **George Kelling** in a 1982 Atlantic Monthly magazine article.

Nutshell: Neighborhood disorder, in the form of minor crimes, is an indicator of low neighborhood social control.

Offenders interpret signs of disorder as a signal that the neighborhood is a place where crime can be committed with impunity.

- Disorder accumulates.
- Fear of crime increases among residents.
- Those residents that can, move away.
- Crime increases.

Disorder = opportunities for crime + residents who don't care.

Broken Windows

Disorder Factors

- Abandoned buildings and poorly maintained vacant lots.
- Litter in the streets, walkways, and parking areas.
- Graffiti on buildings and walls.
- Groups of people loitering/arguing/fighting.
- Poorly lighted streets, buildings, and parking areas.
- Lack of general aesthetics in a neighborhood.
- Subjective determination of order.

Design is important to Broken Windows, in that poor design is both a primary and reinforcing factor.







Broken window
neighborhood or not?





Broken window
neighborhood or not?



Broken Windows Research

1. Association between Neighborhood Disorder and crime.
2. Impact of “Broken Windows” policing on serious crime.

Findings

- Disorder increased levels of fear of crime.
- Disorder increased levels of street crimes.
- Disorder accelerates neighborhood decline (Tipping Point).
- Disorder increases feelings of hopelessness amongst residents.
- Broken Windows policing (arrests for minor violations) has **not** been shown to reduce crime levels on a significant level, **BUT** it can reduce fear of crime
- Best results were when design and maintenance were combined

Broken Windows Research

If Broken Windows policing doesn't reduce crime, than what can we learn from Broken Windows/Disorder that can be applied to crime prevention?

- Inventory of neighborhoods: Where are high disorder areas
 - Qualitative analysis: Can use patrol officers
- Predict emerging crime areas
- Determine alternative solutions to problems
 - Code Enforcement: Increasing fines and penalties
- Design Standards: Mandating minimum design and maintenance standards.
- Research has shown that designing out opportunities **IN ADDITION** to disorder issues has best crime reduction impact

Pockets of Crime

Theory of crime developed by **Peter K.B. St. Jean**.

Nutshell: While the highest crime rates in a city may be concentrated within one general area of a city, the majority of blocks within that area have a low incidence of crime.

Crime is concentrated within certain “pockets of crime” where opportunities for crime are best.

These pockets of crime are largely a function of uneven development caused by planning, zoning, and patterns of development.

Pockets of Crime

Ecological Disadvantage: Presence of Neighborhood Disorder or lack of Collective Efficacy alone is not sufficient for crime hot spots.

High crime areas are a result of Disorder/Collective Efficacy **AND** Opportunities of specific location

Criminals habitually commit crimes in locations that offer **spatial advantages**.

An example of a spatial advantages Neighborhood spaces are unevenly zoned, used and developed.

* Large areas of single family homes (zoning) that are poorly built (no surveillance, poor quality of construction) leads to opportunities for crime.

Pockets of Crime


Findings:

- Even within high crime neighborhoods, only a few micro-locations, such as street blocks, may be crime hotspots.
- The influence of neighborhood disorder alone doesn't cause hotspots; location and spatial positioning create opportunities.
- Location matters in terms of crime reduction strategies and no single strategy is likely to work across an entire neighborhood.
- Parcel and zoning data are important to understanding crime.

Pockets of Crime


Implications for Crime Prevention:


- Context is vitally important. Understand **WHERE** crime is occurring and **WHY** it is happening there and not elsewhere.
- While crime is a result of numerous factors, all of which need to be dealt with, Opportunities are the biggest single factor.
 - Disorder levels will help determine general AREAS of crime.
 - Opportunities will determine locations of high crime.
- Design matters with regards to reducing opportunities
 - Site Design:** How buildings and roads are designed.
 - Zoning is important here
 - Building Design:** How buildings are designed AND built





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
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